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In this paper the role of institutions in determining foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
investigated using a large panel of 107 countries during 1981 and 2005. We find that 
institutions are a robust predictor of FDI and that the most significant institutional 
aspects are linked to propriety rights, the rule of law and expropriation risk. Using a 
novel data set, we also study the impact of institutions on FDI at the sectoral level. 
We find that institutions do not have a significant impact on FDI in the primary sector 
but that institutional quality matters for FDI in manufacturing and particularly in 
services. We also provide policy implications for institutional reform. 
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 1  Introduction 
The importance of social-political factors in determining foreign direct investment 
(FDI) has long been understood and emphasized in the economic literature. For 
example an early study by Basi (1963) investigated the effects of political instability 
on FDI. More recently, the literature has become increasingly concerned with the 
question of: to what extent do improvements in institutional quality help attract more 
FDI? More specifically, the recent literature has involved three developments: (1) 
following the influential study of North (1990), the importance of institutions in 
shaping incentives for investment and economic growth; (2) with the strong growth of 
FDI flows during the 1990s, transition and developing countries have become 
particularly interested in institutional reform as a means of attracting larger shares of 
FDI flows; (3) finally, foreign investors are become increasingly interested in 
institutional quality when deciding in which country to invest (Bevan et al 2004). 
Policy reformers often claim that countries with good institutions attract more FDI.  
According to recent surveys of the relevant literature, nevertheless, there has been no 
clear evidence in favour of institutions. For example, Lim (2001) states that the 
empirical results in this regard are mixed. He also notices that evidence on regulatory, 
bureaucratic red tape and judicial transparency are less encouraging compared with 
that on political risk.  Blonigen (2005) provides some examples of evidence in favour 
of institutions and some evidence against institutions, concluding that more 
convincing evidence requires more studies in the future. Both of the authors attribute 
the inconclusive evidence to various measurement, conceptual, and methodical 
problems in the empirical literature.  
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 More recently, evidence in favour of the FDI/ institutions link (Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002), Busse and Hefeker (2005), Bènassy-Quèrè et al (2005)) seems to be 
mounting, although no conclusive result has yet been established.  This paper adds to 
this emerging literature by addressing the following questions: (1) How robust are 
institutions as a determinant of FDI? (2) What is the relative importance of institutions 
compared to other determinants of FDI? (3) Which institutional aspect matters most 
for FDI flows? (4) Are institutions equally important for all types of FDI? 
Based on a large set of control variables and estimation techniques robust to 
endogeneity, we report that institutions are a highly significant and robust determinant 
of FDI. We find that the impact of institutions on FDI is comparable to that of 
macroeconomic stability and greater than the impact of taxation and infrastructure 
quality. We also identify property rights as the institutional aspect that matters most 
for foreign investors, and, finally, demonstrate that institutions do not matter for FDI 
in the primary sector, but they have a significant impact on FDI in manufacturing and 
in particular on FDI in services. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: section two discusses some of the 
important theoretical arguments linking institutions to FDI and critically reviews the 
recent empirical literature. Section three presents the empirical results and section 
four concludes. 
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 2  FDI and institutions: a theoretical and empirical overview 
What does theory tell us about the impact of institutions on FDI? To provide a 
theoretical perspective, we combine lessons from the literature on FDI determinants 
with the literature on institution and investment. While Dunning's (1993, 2001) 
eclectic paradigm (also: OLI paradigm) provides a framework to study the 
determinants of FDI, North (1990) establishes a link between institutions and 
investment. Dunning's paradigm has been primarily developed to study the behaviour 
of multinational enterprises; i.e. to answer the question why domestic firms own 
foreign production facilities. However, it has also been widely used to study the 
determinants of FDI inflows (Gastanaga et al 1998). North's views on institutions are 
mainly about the impact of institutions on economic activity and investment, but 
institutions are important for both domestic and foreign investors (Bevan et al 2004). 
2.1  The eclectic paradigm and the determinants of FDI inflows 
According to Dunning (1993; 2001), a firm needs to meet three conditions to become 
a multinational enterprise (MNE): (1) it needs to possess certain assets that firms in 
the host country do not have. This so-called ownership advantage is necessary to 
compensate firms for additional costs of operating in a foreign market place (e.g. costs 
of dealing with foreign administrations, regulatory and tax systems, and customer 
preferences). Ownership advantages can be embedded in tangible assets, like patented 
products or production processes, or in intangible ones, such as managerial, 
marketing, and entrepreneurial skills. (2) If the firm satisfies the first condition, it 
must find to its benefit to exploit the ownership advantages through FDI and to keep 
them internally rather than selling them on or leasing them in order to prevent the 
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 asset from being replicated by competitors. This advantage is called internalization 
advantage. (3) Firms must finally find it profitable to combine ownership and 
internalization advantages with some locational advantage in the host country. 
Without such country-specific locational advantage, foreign markets could be served 
exclusively through exporting. 
Dunning identifies several locational advantages that make some countries a more 
attractive destination for multinational enterprises. These include the availability of 
natural resources; quality and prices of inputs; infrastructure quality; investment 
incentives; the economic system and strategies etc. (Dunning 1993; 1998). Dunning 
(2001) does not provide a definitive list of locational advantages but stresses that any 
factor can become a locational advantage if it affects the profitability of establishing a 
production facility in the host country. Such a flexible interpretation of the eclectic 
paradigm has led to the compilation of a long list of potential determinants of FDI, 
which has also raised questions about the paradigm’s value as an analytical tool.   
Perhaps even more of a drawback for empirical analysis, the paradigm does not 
provide a clear theoretical expectation about the relative importance of different 
determinants, which leaves empirical testing as the only means for assessing the 
relative importance of different FDI determinants. Moreover, the paradigm assumes 
that some determinants may affect all types of FDI, although to a varying degree, 
while other determinants may only affect some specific forms of FDI. For example, 
tariffs may encourage market-seeking FDI but discourage efficiency or export seeking 
FDI. Furthermore, market size, will matter for market-seeking FDI but not for natural 
resource seeking FDI. 
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 2.2  Institutions and FDI 
North (1990) defines institutions as the rule of the game in a society. According to 
this definition the institutional framework consists of all kinds of humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interactions, including economic exchange. Institutions 
can be formal (e.g. constitutions, laws etc.), or informal (e.g. conventions and 
customs). Institutions are created to reduce the uncertainty associated with human 
interaction and exchange, and to establish a behavioural norm. Institutions therefore 
provide societies with a predictable framework for interaction. 
North argues that institutions affect economic activities through transaction and 
production costs: good institutions help to lower the cost of doing business and hence 
increase profitability and economic activity. Parties at opposite ends of an economic 
exchange have incomplete information about their counterparts’ true intentions, who 
might decide to cheat, shirk or renege on an agreement. Due to such information 
uncertainty, transaction costs contain a risk premium. North argues that the risk 
premium is a function of institutional quality as it depends on the degree of contract 
enforceability; the protection of property rights; and the likelihood of defection by the 
opposite party. The size of the risk premium is not only a function of institutional 
quality, it also determines the scale of economic exchange in an economy: when 
property rights are poorly protected and contracts enforcement is difficult, then risk 
premium will be high and economic activity will be limited to direct interpersonal 
exchange rather than complex impersonal trade. 
Institutions affect economic activities also via production costs (North, 1990). 
Institutions matter for production as they affect a firm’s environment. To illustrate, if 
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 input markets lack good institutions, more time and resources will need to be devoted 
to monitoring and metering. Institutions can also affect production costs if inefficient 
institutions cause costly production delays; this can be the case if lengthy waiting 
times or bribes are required to receive certain kinds of permits or public services. 
As institutions impact the profitability in the host country, they can present a 
significant locational advantage for multinational enterprises. Dunning (1998) argues 
that recent developments in the global economy have changed MNEs’ perception of 
locational advantages; MNEs increasingly prefer locations that offer the best 
economic and institutional facilities.  The focus of MNEs has reportedly shifted from 
traditional locational advantages, e.g. labour cost or the availability of natural 
resources to so-called creative locational advantages which include knowledge-based 
assets, infrastructure and institutions (Narula and Dunning, 2000; Bevan et al 2004). 
Henisz and Williamson (1999) provide yet a further argument why institutional 
quality matters for FDI. Henisz and Williamson (1999) and Henisz (2000) stress that 
in countries where property rights are poorly protected, MNEs often face 
expropriation risks. For example, the government of the host country may be tempted 
to appropriate some of returns of the MNEs or even nationalize them. Moreover, firms 
in the host country may be able to persuade their government to favour at the expense 
of MNEs. 
2.3  Review of empirical evidence 
This subsection reviews the recent cross-country empirical evidence on the impact of 
institutions on FDI. Table 1 provides an overview of the different studies in terms of 
country samples, time periods, and institutional variables used; it also summarizes the 
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 main findings. The literature appears to offer several lessons. First, the majority of 
studies find that institutions, however defined or measured, matter for FDI. However, 
this conclusion is not shared by Asiedu (2002), Noorbakhsh et al. (2001), Harms and 
Ursprung (2002) and June and Singh (1996). Asiedu (2002) finds that neither political 
risk nor expropriation risk has a significant impact on FDI and Noorbakhash et al 
(2001) fails to establish a link between democracy and political risk and FDI. Harms 
and Ursprung (2002) and June and Singh (1996) find that the effects of institutions on 
FDI are not robust. 
(Insert table 1 about here) 
The failure of these studies to identify any significant impact of institutions on FDI 
could be due to either sampling or measurement issues. Studies that tend to reject any 
significant impact of institutions on FDI are generally based on rather small country 
samples.
1 Campos and Kinoshita (2003) highlight that the effect of a particular 
variable can be underestimated in a small sample if this variable exhibits limited 
variation within that particular sample.  As institutional indicators usually exhibit little 
time variation, inference on their impact should ideally be based on large samples, 
which represent the whole global market, rather than a subset. 
Measurement problems result when a single index is used to capture a broad, complex 
factor such as institutions. Foreign investors are likely to base their investment 
decisions on overall institutional quality rather than a single institutional aspect such 
as democracy or corruption. For example, a democratic country may have a high level 
of corruption or vice versa. Thus, using an index that captures only one aspect of 
                                                 
1 For example, Noorbakhsh et al (2001) use 36 developing countries, June and Singh (1996) use 31 
countries, and Harms and Ursprung (2002) use 62 countries. 
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 institutions as a proxy for overall institutional quality is likely to underestimate the 
role of institutions in determining FDI; a comprehensive measure of institutional 
quality allows for a more complete assessment of the role of institutions on 
determining FDI inflows. 
Second, despite an apparent consensus that institutions matter for FDI, the literature 
provides little guidance about the relative importance of institutional reform as mean 
to attract FDI. Policy makers may be interested in whether institutional reform has a 
larger pay-off than other policies in terms of attracting FDI. With the exception of 
Gastanaga et al (1998) and Asiedu (2005), the extant literature offers little insight as 
to how institutional quality ranks relative to other policy measures for attracting FDI. 
Gastanaga et al (1998) investigate if policy and institutional variables have any impact 
on FDI. They find institutional variables like contract enforcement, nationalization 
risk, and bureaucratic delay to have significant effects on FDI, but they do not try to 
compare them with the impact of other variables. The exception from this is 
corruption. They find that a doubling in the corruption index has an effect on FDI 
inflows that is approximately equal to a percent increase in the corporate tax rate, but 
this result is not robust. Asiedu (2005) compares the impact of institutions with the 
impact of non-policy variables, such as the availability of natural resources and 
market size of FDI, and concludes that countries that are small or lack natural 
resources can increase FDI by improving institutions. Both of the studies use rather 
limited country samples, which make their results difficult to generalize. 
Third, there is little agreement on which institutional aspect matters most for FDI. 
Jensen (2003) stresses that democracy and other political institutions are the most 
relevant institutional aspects for FDI. Li and Resnick (2003) on the other hand find 
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 that democracy loses out to property rights, once the latter are included. This 
ambiguity calls for further investigation to establish which institutional aspect matters 
most for FDI. Such an investigation has considerable policy implications. If FDI is 
predominately affected by institutional aspects that can be considered “exogenous” to 
the current political establishment (e.g. democracy and other political institutions 
which would require constitutional change or a change of the ruling political elite), 
policy choices - short of regime change - are limited. However, if FDI is primarily 
related to more readily changeable “endogenous” institutional aspects, such as rule of 
law or bureaucratic quality, governments have greater policy space to attract FDI by 
reforming these institutional aspects. A larger sample and the grouping of single 
institutional indices into homogenous categories that capture major institutional 
aspects can help identify which institutional aspects are most conducive to FDI. 
Fourth, some authors appear to agree that the impact of institutions on FDI differs by 
sector. Asiedu (2002), for example, argues that the insignificance of political risk in 
her study may well be explained by the high profitability of FDI geared towards the 
oil sector which more than compensates for political risk. Busse (2004) alludes to an 
important change in the relationship between democracy and FDI. While in the 1970s 
and 1980s, democracy has not been significant and was even in the 1970s negatively 
associated with FDI, the relationship appears to have turned positive and significant in 
the 1990s. Busse mainly attributes this result to a shift in the decomposition of FDI 
flows to developing countries, where FDI is being increasingly attracted by 
manufacturing and services, rather than the primary sector. Spar (1999) argues that 
FDI in the primary sector may not be sensitive to institutional quality in the host 
country: as resource-seeking FDI depends on the availability of raw materials, 
compared to other kinds of FDI, choices are greatly limited when picking between 
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 alternative investment sites. Referring to Spar’s (1999) views, Busse (2004) argues 
that initial FDI flows to developing countries were often geared towards the 
exploitation of raw materials and both MNEs and host governments saw it in their 
best interest to collaborate through rent-sharing; this usually entailed that the host 
country would mainly focus on protecting and maintaining investors’ access to the 
natural resource. 
To our knowledge there has been no systematic attempt to study the impact of 
institutions on FDI by sectoral allocation. This has been largely due to lack of data on 
sectoral FDI. However, with the recent publication by UNCTAD of sectoral level data 
on FDI inflows, we are able to fill this gap in the literature. 
3  Empirical analysis 
This section describes the data and methodology. It also presents empirical results and 
discusses policy implications 
3.1  Design Issues 
There are two key issues that have to be addressed in any empirical investigation of 
the impact of institutions on FDI, namely: the appropriate model specification and 
endogeneity bias. Theory offers no clear-cut guidance for model specification. While 
the OLI paradigm has become central for most empirical work, it does not, as already 
mentioned, specify a definite set of FDI determinants. In a reflection on the empirical 
literature Moosa and Cardak (2006) critique that in the search for FDI determinants 
researchers often report the most appealing results to suit their specific research aims. 
Some studies are more careful and, for example, Chakrabarti (2001), apply extreme 
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 bound analysis to assess the robustness of different determinants of FDI. Chakrabarti 
(2001) reports market size (measured as GDP per capita) as the most robust 
determinant of FDI and finds that trade openness is more likely to be correlated with 
FDI than any other potential FDI determinant. Building on this finding, and on the 
fact that most empirical studies includes market size and trade openness in their model 
specifications, we start from a parsimonious model specification that includes only 
market size, trade openness, and an index for institutional quality. We then add other 




Where FDI is the log of foreign direct investment per capita, GDP is the log of GDP 
per capita; Trade is trade (imports and exports) as a ratio of GDP, Inst refers to the 
ICRG Index, and V  is a vector of other controlling variables. In the basic model 
specification  4 β  is set to zero. 
The second difficulty that any empirical analysis on FDI determinants faces is that of 
endogeneity, which can bias estimated coefficients and cause invalid statistical 
inference. Endogeneity arises from the simultaneity between FDI and its 
determinants: as FDI is likely to increase economic activity in the host countries, a 
host country’s GDP per capita and measures of trade are likely to be endogenous; 
institutions are also feasibly endogenous. The literature on institutional change 
indicates that economic outcomes may impact institutions. From this line of 
reasoning, it seems feasible to argue that FDI potentially affects institutions in the 
host country. To mitigate against endogeneity bias all endogenous variables have been 
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 lagged by one period, i.e. five years. We also report results based on difference and 
system GMM where lagged differences and levels of endogenous variables are used 
as instruments to control for endogeneity. 
3.2  Description of variables and data sources 
Our analysis is based on 107 countries and covers the period from 1981 to 2005. Data 
availability restricts model specifications and sample sizes in some cases. But even 
the most restrictive model specification still includes close to 50 countries. Appendix 
A provides variable definitions and data sources. In line with other studies we use FDI 
per capita, FDI, as our dependent variable, which is the log of net inflows of foreign 
direct investment per capita in USA dollar. The International Country Risk Guide 
Index, ICRG is used to proxy institutional quality. 
The ICRG index has several advantages over other measures of institutional quality. 
First, it provides an assessment of institutional quality for 142 countries over the 
period 1984-2005. This enlarges the sample and allows us to perform panel 
estimations. Moreover, the ICRG provides information on 12 dimensions of 
institutional quality, which can be used to construct a collective indicator that captures 
the quality of the overall institutional environment. These 12 indicators can also be 
grouped in homogenous categories to proxy specific aspects of institutions, such as 
the protection of propriety rights. This flexibility enables us to study the general effect 
of institutions on FDI and to compare it with the effects of other policy-related 
determinants of FDI. It is also enables us to identify institutional aspects most closely 
related to FDI. 
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 3.3  The empirical results 
In this section we report the results of our panel analysis. Table 2 summarises the 
findings from different model specifications, starting with Model 1, which is the basic 
model specification according to (1). Subsequent models add different control 
variables to the basic model specification.  
Model 1 is based on a random effect specification of the basic model. This 
specification is supported by a Hausman test, reported in table 2. In this model all the 
explanatory variables have the correct signs and are significant at the 1% level: 
countries with larger markets, higher degrees of openness, and better institutional 
quality received more FDI. This finding indicates that after controlling for market size 
and degree of openness, countries with better institutions attract more FDI inflows. In 
the following models, the basic model specification is augmented by other potential 
FDI determinants, which have been suggested by the literature. Model 2 adds inflation 
to capture the impact of macroeconomic stability on FDI. As expected, inflation has a 
negative impact on FDI and is significant at the 1% level. Model 3 controls for quality 
of infrastructure, proxied by telephone mainlines per 1,000 people. As can be seen 
from the table, infrastructure quality has a significant positive impact on FDI.  Model 
4 controls for the level of taxation. Taxes appear to have a significant and negative 
impact on FDI. In model 5 we replace the trade-GDP ratio with a policy-related 
variable, the mean tariff rate, and in model 6 we additionally expand on the role of 
market size by including GDP growth rate to control for the impact of potential 
growth of the market size on FDI. The results show that both tariff rates and GDP 
growth have a significant impact on FDI, where the tariff term enters with a negative 
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 sign and growth with a positive sign.  More interestingly, institutional quality 
maintains its significance in all of these model specifications. 
(Insert table 2 about here) 
In models 7 through 11, we test the sensitivity of model 6 by controlling for further 
potential FDI determinants. Model 7 shows that exchange rate distortions, measured 
by the index of the difference between the official and black market exchange rate, 
have a negative but insignificant impact on FDI
2. In model 8, we control for 
government interventions, measured by government investment as a share of gross 
investment, and in model 9, we control for wage levels, proxied by the mean wage in 
manufacturing in current US Dollars. Both government intervention and wage levels 
have a negative but insignificant impact on FDI. In models 7, 8, and 9 institutional 
quality maintains its significance. 
Models 10 and 11 include human capital and natural resources availability 
respectively. Human capital, measured by average years of higher schooling in the 
total population, has a positive and significant impact on FDI. The natural resources 
availability term, measured by the ratio of primary exports to GDP, has a positive but 
not significant impact on FDI. However, controlling for these variables does not affect 
the relevance of institutional quality for FDI. Throughout, all model specifications the 
                                                 
2 Higher values of the exchange rate distortion index means less difference between black market and 
official exchange rates.  
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 impact of institutions on FDI appears to be insensitive to changes in control 
variables
3. 
Our results also prove robust to alternative estimation approaches consisting of OLS 
with panel-corrected standard errors (model 12), difference-GMM (model 13) and 
system-GMM (model 14) Beyond a robustness check, GMM also allows us to test for 
agglomeration effects, which have recently been proposed as an additional 
determinant of FDI. 
Models 12 through 14 estimates model 6 by OLS with panel-corrected standard 
errors, PCSE (model 12), which assumes that disturbances are, by default, 
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panel. The impact of 
institutions on FDI is still found to be significant after controlling for the possible 
autocorrelation of the error terms across panels. 
In model 13, we control for the impact of agglomeration economies. Recently, several 
studies have acknowledged that the presence of foreign investors may act as a catalyst 
to attract further investors (Dunning, 1998). There are several reasons for such 
agglomeration effect. Firms less familiar with a specific country may take the 
presence of other foreign firms as a sign for a locational advantage and of high 
profitability. In addition, new investor may try to benefit from positive externalities, 
such as knowledge spillovers, specialized labour, and intermediate inputs, resulting 
from locating their activities next to other firms (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). 
                                                 
3 We also include other potential determinants of FDI like external debt, domestic investment, 
government consumption, trade balance. None of these variables affects the significance of 
institutions. The results are available upon request.  
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 To test the impact of agglomeration economies, we include lagged FDI in the model 
specification. This changes the model specification to a dynamic panel-data model. 
Because the lagged dependent variables and the time-unvarying country-specific error 
terms are correlated, both random and fixed effects models produce inconsistent 
estimation here. Arellano and Bond (1991) solve this problem by using generalized 
method of moment GMM. They eliminate the country-specific error term by taking 
the first difference of the model and then use the lagged levels of the dependent 
variable as instruments for the first difference of the dependent variable. The same 
approach can be applied to any endogenous variable within this set of regressors. This 
technique is often referred to as difference-GMM (Baum, 2005). Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) acknowledge a potential weakness in 
difference-GMM, since the lagged levels are often poor instruments for first-
differenced variables (Baum, 2005). They propose using lagged levels as well as 
lagged differences as instruments. This technique is usually referred to as system 
GMM. Both difference and system GMM requires a lack of second-order serial 
correlation in the residuals of the differenced model. Arellano and Bond developed a 
test for that and used a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions to verify the overall 
appropriateness of instruments. 
Models 13 and 14 in table 2 show the results of difference and system GMM, 
respectively. In both models we treated GDP per capita, GDP growth, and institutions 
as endogenous variables. We also corrected the potential downward bias in the 
estimated standard error by using the Windmeijer finite-sample correction 
(Windmeijer 2005).  The results show that the basic assumption of no second-order 
serial correlation is satisfied in both models and that the Sargan test confirms the 
validity of the instruments. In both models, lagged FDI has a positive and significant 
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 impact on FDI and this indicates that agglomeration economies matter for FDI.   
Interestingly, institutional quality maintains a significant positive impact on FDI even 
when accounting for agglomeration economies. It is noteworthy that this is not the 
case for inflation, infrastructural quality, and taxation, which maintain the correct 
sign, but lose significances. Tariff rate and GDP growth are sensitive to model 
specification. 
Table 2 provides a summary of all model specifications and reveals that institutional 
quality appears to be a highly robust FDI predictor.  The significance of institutions in 
determining FDI appears not to be sensitive to model specifications, control variables, 
or estimation technique. The only other consistent predictor of FDI appears to be 
market size, measured as GDP per capita. 
3.4  The relative importance of institutions 
When competing for FDI, policy makers face a range of policy choices, including 
macro economic stabilization, tax and tariff reform, and institutional reform. This 
section attempts a horse race between alternative policies in order to establish which 
policy has the largest pay-off in terms of FDI. 
Comparing the quantitative impact of institutions with that of other policy variable 
raises the problem of unit measurement and to address this problem, we use beta 
coefficient analysis. This analysis avoids the problem of unit measurement by 
standardising regressors, since the beta coefficients measure the impact of a one-
standard-deviation change in a given regressor on the dependent variable. This 
approach allows us to directly compare the impact of different variables on FDI in 
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 quantitative terms.
4  Model 15 in table 2 shows beta coefficients for model 12. A one 
standard deviation increase in institutional quality raises the log of FDI by 0.155 
standard deviations according to model 15. Model 15 also indicates that the impact of 
institutions on FDI is slightly greater than the impact of inflation. And it is greater 
than the impact of taxation and infrastructure quality and smaller than the impact of 
tariff rate. This finding seems to suggest that improving institutional quality is as good 
or even better as all other policy options available to policymakers, except tariff rate, 
which has an even greater impact on FDI. 
3.5  Which institutional aspect matters most for FDI? 
The empirical literature on the role of institutions places generally little attention on 
the relative importance of different institutional aspects. Existing studies focus either 
on a summary index of institutional quality, which encompasses a broad spectrum of 
institutional aspects, or on particular institutional aspect, such as for example 
democracy. As it is entirely plausible that certain aspects of institutional quality might 
matter more for FDI, we attempt to rank in this section the relative importance of 
property rights, bureaucratic efficiency, and democracy in determining FDI. 
For this purpose we split the ICRG comprehensive index along three institutional 
aspects: (1)  A  Property Rights index combines Law and Order and Investment 
Profile. Law and Order assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, 
popular observance of the law, and the effectiveness of sanctions.  Investment Profile 
assesses contract viability, expropriation risk, and profits repatriation. (2) The 
                                                 
4 To compute beta coefficients, all variables included in the regression (regressors as well as dependent 
variable) are standardised by subtract the mean of each variable and divide it by its standard 
deviation. Beta coefficients are sometimes also referred to as standardised coefficients.  
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 Bureaucratic Efficiency index combines Corruption and Bureaucracy Quality.  Both 
assess the strength and quality of the bureaucracy and the extent to which bureaucracy 
is autonomous from political pressure and free from corruption. (3) The Democracy 
index combines Military in Politics and Democratic Accountability and reflects 
checks & balances within the political system, and the extent of military involvement 
in politics.
5 
To assess the impact of different institutional aspects on FDI, we replaced the 
comprehensive index in model 6 with the three sub-indexes of institutional quality 
above. And to ensure robustness of our findings, Table 3 reports estimates based on 
random effects (Model 1), OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Model 2), 
difference GMM (Model 3) and system GMM (Model 4). 
(Insert table 3 about here) 
In models 1 and 2 GDP per capita, GDP growth and institutional variables are lagged 
by one period to reduce any potential bias due to endogeneity.  We find that property 
rights are the only institutional dimension that seems to matters for FDI; bureaucratic 
efficiency and democracy are not found to be a significant determinant of FDI. This 
finding is robust to model specifications. 
This result is in line with for example Noorbakhash et al (2001) who fail to establish a 
link between democracy, political risk and FDI; it possibly also explains why Harms 
and Ursprung (2002), and June and Singh (1996), using a composite indicator of 
institutional quality fail to establish robust effects of institutional quality on FDI. 
                                                 
5  Our indices for property rights, bureaucratic efficiency and democracy combine the underlying ICRG 
sub-indices with equal weighting. 
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 3.6  The role of institutions: evidence by sector 
Asiedu (2002) and Busse (2004) suggest that the impact of institutions on FDI may 
vary by sector allocation. Asiedu (2002) argues that political risk is less relevant for 
FDI in the oil sector. Busse (2004) argues that democracy matters more for FDI in 
manufacturing and services but less for FDI in the primary sector. 
In this section we empirically investigate the sector-specific impact of institutions on 
FDI. To maximise country coverage, we combine two comparable data sources on 
sectoral FDI:  OECD’s the International Direct Investment Statistics Year Book and 
UNCTAD’s  World Investment Directory. We first report unconditional 
contemporaneous correlations between the ICRG institution index and sectoral FDI.  
Table 4 provides first support for Spar (1999)’s hypothesis that FDI in primary sector 
may not be sensitive to institutions. The relation between institutions and FDI into 
both manufacturing and services is significantly stronger. 
(Insert table 4 about here) 
We next report conditional correlations between institutions and sectoral FDI by 
including other potential sector-specific FDI determinants. Bar a few studies, the 
empirical literature on sectoral determinants of FDI is virtually non-existent. As such, 
there is little guidance on appropriate control variable, in particular with respect to 
FDI into the primary sector. 
Dunning (1993) argues that locational advantages for natural resource-seeking FDI 
include the availability of the resource; the quality of infrastructure; and the level of 
taxation. Market size and the degree of openness arguments appear less relevant for 
21 
 FDI into the primary sector, but are identified as important for FDI for manufacturing 
(Root and Ahmend, 1979) and services (Kolstad and Villanger, 2004). Root and 
Ahmed (1979) test the role of value-added in manufacturing and manufactured 
imports both as shares of GDP as determinants of FDI into manufacturing, and they 
find them insignificant. Kolstad and Villanger (2004) find that trade openness and 
FDI into manufacturing is positively correlated with FDI into services. 
Taking this into consideration, we model FDI into the primary sector as a function of 
the availability of natural resources; the quality of infrastructure; and the tax level. 
Following Sachs and Warner (1995) exports of raw material as per cent of GDP is 
used as proxy for the availability of natural resource. As before, we use the number of 
telephone lines per 1000 people as a proxy for infrastructure quality. 
We specify FDI into manufacturing as a function of the value-added in manufacturing 
as a percent of GDP; the degree of openness; the rate of economic-wide inflation, 
infrastructure quality, and tax level. FDI into services is specified as a function of the 
value-added in services as percent of GDP; the degree of openness; the rate of 
economic-wide inflation, infrastructure quality, and tax level. Since services FDI 
might be driven by manufacturing FDI (Kolstad and Villanger (2004)), we also 
include manufacturing FDI in the service FDI regression. 
Table 5 presents the findings for FDI into the primary sector. We find that the positive 
effect of institutions on primary sector FDI looses significance once we control for 
other determinants. The availability of natural resource and low levels of taxation are 
therefore much more relevant for attracting primary sector FDI than institutional 
quality, which is not significant. 
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 (Insert table 5 about here) 
Tables 6 and 7 show that institutions clearly matter for FDI in manufacturing and 
services FDI.  More interestingly, the role of institutions in determining FDI into 
services seems stronger than for manufacturing FDI. Modes l in Tables 6 and 7 show 
that institutions have more power in explaining FDI in services than in explaining 
manufacturing FDI. Furthermore the coefficient on institutions in the regression on 
services FDI is larger and more significant compared to the regression on FDI in 
manufacturing. 
(Insert table 6 and 7 about here) 
This result has the following policy implications. First, for a country that tries to 
attract FDI into the primary sector, improving the quality of infrastructure and 
reducing tax levels is more relevant than institutional reform. Second, institutional 
reform can attract more FDI inflows into services than manufacturing. Third, and 
more importantly, the increasing share of FDI into the service sector at the expense of 
both primary and manufacturing FDI in recent years, as evident from Table 8, implies 
that institutional reform becomes an increasingly important tool for countries that try 
to increase their share in FDI inflows. 
(Insert table 8 about here) 
4  Conclusion 
This paper assesses the impact of institutions in determining FDI inflows and provides 
policy lessons for institutional reform. To robustify our results, we apply different 
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 econometric techniques and a large panel of countries. The main results of our paper 
can be summarized as following: 
First, institutions appear to be a robust determinant of FDI inflows. Institutions appear 
to have a consistent effect on FDI under different model specifications and various 
controlling variables. 
Second, the most relevant institutional aspects for FDI appear to be those linked to the 
protection of property rights such as rule of law and expropriation risk, all of which 
are institutions which are changeable in the short to medium-run. This implies that 
policy makers stand a good chance of attracting FDI inflows by strengthening the 
legal and judicial system. 
Third, regarding the impact of institutions on FDI by sector, it appears that institutions 
do not matter much for FDI into the primary sector. However, institutional quality 
matters for FDI in manufacturing and to an even greater extent for FDI in services. As 
such, institutional reform is unlikely to attract FDI into the primary sector, but likely 
to benefit FDI into manufacturing and services. As services FDI are accounting for a 
ever greater share in total FDI, the importance of institutional reform as a policy tool 
for attracting FDI in general may even increase in coming years. 
Finally, compared with other relevant policy variables, institutional reform appears to 
be an important option for attracting FDI. Indeed the improvement of institutions 
appears as important as macroeconomic stability in this regard and better institutions 
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
FDI  Log of Foreign direct investment per capita, net 
inflows, current US$  UNCTAD, FDI database. 
GDP  Log of GDP per capita, (current US$)  World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
Trade Ratio  Log of Merchandise trade (% of GDP)  World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
GDP Growth  GDP Growth (annual %)  World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
Institutions  ICRG Index, 0-100 scale  PRS Group 
Inflation  Consumer prices (annual %) 
 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
Income Tax  Top Marginal Income Tax Rate. 
Economic Freedom of the 
World, 2006 Annual Report. 
The Fraser Institute. 




Index of Difference between official exchange 
rate and black market rate, 0-10 scale. 
EFW, 2006 Annual Report. The 
Fraser Institute. 
Government Size  Government investment as a percentage of gross 
investment. 
EFW, 2006 Annual Report. The 
Fraser Institute. 
Infrastructure  Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)  World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
Human capital  Average years of higher schooling in the total 
population. 




Simple Average of indices of 
Law and Order & 
Investment Profile, scale 0-12. 




Simple Average of indices of 
Bureaucracy Quality & Corruption, scale 0-12. 
 




Simple Average of indices of Democratic 
Accountability& Military in Politics, Scale 0-12. 
Calculated from ICRG Data, 
PRS Group. 
Wages 
Wages and salaries in current US Dollars in 
manufacturing sector divided by number of 
Employees 
 
UNIDO, Industrial Statistics 
Natural 





 Table 1 
Author(s)  Sample  Institutions aspects considered & sources  Main results 
Addison & 
Heshmati 2003  110 countries  Democracy; Freedom House.  Democracy has a positive effect on FDI. 
Asiedu 2002 
71 developing countries. 
1988-97 
Political risk; Barro & Lee 1993. Expropriation risk; ICRG PRS. 




Corruption, rule of law; ICRG PRS, Political risk; Cross-National Time 





12 subcomponents of ICRG, Investment profile, internal and external 
conflict, ethnic and religious tension, rule of law, democracy, Military in 
politics Government stability, Socio-economic conditions, Quality 
bureaucracy, Corruption. 
Government stability, the absence of internal conflict and ethnic tensions, basic democratic 
rights and ensuring law and order are highly significant determinants of FDI 
Busse 2004 
69 developing &emerging 
market countries. 1972-
2001  Democracy; Freedom House 
There is a powerful positive link between democracy and FDI, but this does not hold for 
1970’s and 1980’s. 
Campos& 
Kinoshita 2003 
25 transition economies. 
1990-1998.  Rule of law; ICRG & quality of bureaucracy; Campos 2000.  Both institutional aspects are positive and significant. 
Drabek &Payne 
1999  49 countries 1991-95.  ICRG Political Risk Index; PRS. 
A nation that takes steps to increase the degree of transparency in its policies and 
institutions could expect significant increase in FDI inflows. 




Nationalization risk, Contract enforcement, Bureaucratic delay; Business 
Environmental Risk Intelligence. BERI. Corruption; Mauro 1995.  Different institutional characteristics are shown to have significant effects on FDI. 
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 Globerman & 
Shapiro 2002  144 countries 1995-97 
Governance Index, Rule of law, Political instability Regulatory quality, 
Gove.t effectiveness, Graft and corruption, Voice and accountability; 
Kaufmann et al 1999 
The general Governance Index is more important than its subcomponent and than Human 
development index and Infrastructure index. 
Harms & 
Ursprung 2002 
62 developing & 
emerging-market 
countries. 1989-97 
Democracy; Freedom House. Political risk: expropriation, exchange 
control, and contract repudiation; ICRG. Business Environment: 
corruption, bureaucratic quality and law and order; ICRG PRS. 
FDI appear to be attracted by countries in which civil and political freedom is respected. 
Other institutional aspects do not have robust effects on FDI. 
Jensen 2003  114 countries. 1970-97. 
Democracy; Polity III data Jagger & Gurr 1996, Government Reputation, 
Expropriation, Corruption, Rule of law, Bureaucratic quality; Easterly 
Data Set Easterly 1999. 
Democracy has a robust positive effect on FDI. Other institutional aspects have no 
significant effects on FDI or on the effect of democracy on FDI. 
Jun & Singh 
1996  31 countries. 1970-93. 
Political risk, Operational risk; Business Environmental Risk 
Intelligence. BERI. Political rights; Freedom House.  Institutional aspects have positive but not robust effects on FDI. 
Kolstad & 
Tondel 2002 
61 developing countries 
1989-2000. 
12 subcomponents of ICRG, Investment profile, internal and external 
conflict, ethnic and religious tension, rule of law, democracy, Military in 
politics Government stability, Socio-economic conditions, Quality 
bureaucracy, Corruption. 
Foreign investors are concerned about and deterred by ethnic tension and internal conflict 
in a country. They pay less attention to external conflict, law and order and military in 
politics. Government stability and bureaucratic quality do not matter for FDI. Democracy 
is a very robust determinant of FDI. 
Li & Resnick 
2003 
53 developing countries. 
1982-95  Democracy; Polity IV. Property rights protection; Knack & Keefer 1995. 
Democratic institutions affect FDI inflows both positively, by improving property rights, 
and negatively, by imposing constraints on FDI and host country's government. 
Meon & Sekkat 
2004 107  countries. 
ICRG Political Risk Index; PRS, Corruption; Transparency International 
& Rule of law & Government effectiveness index; Kaufmann et al 1999. 




36 developing countries 







(1) Hausman Test: chi2 (3)=3.02 Pro >chi2 = 0.  (2) M  Hansen test of overid. Restr ctions: chi2 (  =53.86, ob >  813, Arellano-Bond test that average  iance in residuals o  order 2 is 
H0: no autocorrelation   z = 0.07   Pr > z = 0.9450. (3) Model 13 Hansen test of overid. Restrictions: chi2 (82)   =  70.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.807. Arellano-Bond test that average auto covariance in residuals of order 2 is: 
H0: no autocorrelation   z = 0.44   Pr > z = 0.661. *, **, and *** indicate that the variable is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   
b 3880, odel 12- i 64) Pr chi2 = 0. auto covar f
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
Lagged FDI  - - - - - - - - - - - -  0.116  0.287  - 
                                       (1.68)*  (3.97)***   
GDP  0.654 0.720 0.359 0.444 0.484 0.521 0.528 0.815 0.521 0.780 0.521 0.814 1.140 0.494 0.432 
   (7.18)***  (7.04)*** (2.68)*** (2.69)*** ( 2.75)*** (2.87)*** (2.94)*** (4.02)***  (2.92)*** ( 3.43)*** (1.75)*  (7.77)*** (2.23)**  (2.86)*** (7.77)*** 
GDP Growth  -  -  -  -  -  0.047 0.047 0.056 0.050 0.060 0.029 0.018 0.077 0.042 0.033 
                  (2.34)**  (2.31)**  (2.11)**  (2.48)**  (2.12)**  (1.02)  (0.64)  (1.91)*  (1.01)  (0.64) 
Trade Ratio  0.762  0.694  0.556  0.404  - - - - - - - - - - - 
   (4.11)***  (3.38)*** (2.67)*** (1.84)*                                  
Institutions  0.052 0.045 0.033 0.028 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.024 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.031 0.155 
   (7.48)***  (6.24)*** (4.51)*** (3.62)*** (2.94)*** (2.34)** (2.28)** (1.99)** (2.14)** (2.19)**  (2.85)*** (3.93)*** (  2.40)**  (2.78)*** (3.93)*** 
Inflation  -  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.0003  -0.0002  -0.1210 
      (-7.29)*** (-7.41)*** (-5.81)*** (-6.65)*** (-6.23)*** (-6.34)*** (-6.29)***  (-6.24)*** (-6.06)*** (-4.61)*** (-3.20)*** (-1.24)  (-0.76) (-3.20)*** 
Infrastructure  -  -  0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.002  0.0005  0.0018  0.0838 
         (5.52)*** (4.75)*** (4.17)*** (4.01)*** (3.99)*** (1.79)*  (4.25)*** (0.68)  (2.81)*** (1.70)*  (0.23)  (1.44)  ( 1.70)* 
Income Tax  -  -  -  -0.016 -0.011 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.006 -0.011 -0.002 -0.004  -0.0005  -0.0192 
               (-2.71)*** (-1.77)*  (-1.66)*  (-1.29) (-1.05) (-1.53) (-0.82) (-1.32) (-0.58) (-0.56) (-0.09) (-0.58) 
Tariff  -  -  -  -  -0.033 -0.033 -0.031 -0.036 -0.033 -0.039 -0.037 -0.037 -0.016 -0.025 -0.263 
               (-4.48)*** (-4.46)*** (-4.50)*** (-4.86)***  (-4.42)*** (-5.35)*** (-5.01)*** (-9.97)*** (-1.60)  (-4.13)*** (-9.97) 
Exchange Rate Distortion  - - - - - -  0.030  - -    -    - - - 
                     (1.02)                         
Government Size  - - - - - - -  -0.007  - - -    - - - 
                        (-0.97)                      
Wages  - - - - - - - -  -0.026  - -    - - - 
                           (-0.12)                   
Human Capital  - - - - - - - -    1.359  -    - - - 
                              (2.10)**                
Natural Resources Abundance - - - - - - - - - -  0.006           - 
                                 (0.59)             
 R2  0.568 0.577 0.577 0.643 0.678 0.681 0.682 0.732 0.702 0.729 0.700 0.724  -  -  0.724 
Number of groups  107  102  102  82 82 82 82 55 80 51 66 76 64 80 76 
Table 2 Table 3 
Model 1  2  3  4 
Lagged FDIpc  - -  0.100  0.321 
         (1.88)*  (3.62)***
GDPpc  0.476 0.832 0.879  0.530 
   (2.65)*** (8.15)*** (1.38)  (2.78)***
GDP Growth  - 0.012  0.043  0.030 
      (0.44)  (1.82)*  (0.86) 
Inflation  -0.001 -0.001  -0.0004  -0.0003 
   (-6.49)*** (-3.40)*** (-1.42)  (-1.38) 
Infrastructure  0.005 0.002 0.003  0.002 
   (4.49)*** (1.83)* (1.12) (1.37) 
Income Tax  -0.012 -0.004 -0.012  0.0001 
   (-1.94)* (-0.99) (-1.31) (0.01) 
Tariff  -0.035 -0.039 -0.026  -0.025 
   (-4.69)*** (-11.02)*** (-3.17)*** (-3.84)***
Property Rights  0.080 0.139 0.180  0.154 
   (1.73)* (2.76)***  (2.25)**  (2.48)** 
Bureaucracy &Corruption  0.023 0.029 0.011  -0.003 
  (0.45) (1.04) (0.17)  (-0.05) 
Democracy  -0.008 -0.014 0.005 0.011 
  (-0.23) (-0.55) (0.06) (0.23) 
Constant  -0.268 -3.229  -  -2.480 
 R2  0.672 0.719  -  - 
Number of groups  82 76 64  80 
Number of observations  238 224 181  270 
(1) Model1  Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.13  Pr > z =  0.898, Hansen test of overid. 
Restrictions: chi2(74)   =  51.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.979. (2) Model 2 Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences: z 
= 0.23 Pr > z = 0.819. Hansen test of overid. Restrictions: chi2 (98)   = 70.54 Prob > chi2 = 0.984 
 
Table 4 




Institutions 1.00  -  -  - 
FDI Primary  0.25  1.00  -  - 
FDI 
Manufacturing 
0.71 0.38 1.00  - 




Model 1  2  3 
Institutions   0.070 0.033  0.025 
   (3.31)*** (1.51) (1.33) 
Natural Resources Abundance  - 0.122  0.118 
      (7.70)*** (7.42)*** 
Tax  - -0.055  -0.057 
      (-3.73)*** (-3.44)*** 
Infrastructure  - 0.161  0.209 
     (1.01)  (1.12) 
Constant   -3.178 -0.795  -0.225 
 R2  0.054 0.510  0.499 
Number of groups  55 46  45 







Model 1  2  3 
Institutions   0.092 0.063 0.031 
   (12.18)*** (5.91)*** (3.13)***
Market size  - 0.052  0.065 
      (2.37)**  (3.04)***
Trade Ratio  - 0.005  0.006 
     (1.48)  (2.70)***
Inflation  - -0.001  -0.002 
     (-4.00)*** (-4.68)***
Infrastructure  - 0.262  0.360 
     (2.12)**  (2.72)***
Tax  - -0.002  -0.006 
      (-0.28)  (-0.71) 
Constant   -3.615 -3.970 -2.392 
 R2  0.453 0.628 0.591 
Number of groups  58 49 48 














Model  1 2 3 4 
Institutions   0.140 0.070 0.031 0.023 
   (9.84)*** (5.20)*** (2.16)**  (1.81)* 
Market size  -  0.049 0.056 0.032 
      (2.42)**  (3.15)*** ( 1.40) 
Trade Ratio  -  0.012 0.014 0.017 
     (2.62)*** (3.33)*** (3.51)***
Inflation  - -0.001  0.0001  -0.001 
     (-4.00)** (0.34)  (-6.44)***
Infrastructure  -  0.343 0.037 0.579 
     (2.17)**  (0.27)  (4.36)***
tax  -  -0.026 -0.022 -0.034 
      (-3.38)*** (-3.43)*** (-3.60)***
Manufacturing FDI  -  - 0.621 - 
        (5.67)***   
Constant   -6.414 -5.679 -3.881 -2.636 
 R2  0.511 0.606 0.707 0.518 
Number of groups  57 49 48 48 












   1990  2002 
   Primary  Manufacturing Service  Primary  Manufacturing  Service 
World 9  42  49  6  34  60 
Developed countries  10  41  49  6  32  62 
Developing countries  7  46  47  7  38  55 
 
 